L’enigma di Apple: quale enforcement per i diritti dei consumatori e della concorrenza nel 21esimo Secolo in Europa?giugno 12, 2013 alle 5:32 pm | Pubblicato in CONSUMATORI, DIRITTO, INTERNET | Lascia un commento
Etichette: Consumer & Competition Law, enforcement, European Law, Il vizietto di Apple, Phil Evans, The Apple Conundrum
Bell’articolo dell’amico Phil Evans per la nostra rivista di consumer policy online Consumatori, Diritti e Mercato circa quello che, prenendo in considerazione le diverse modalità con le quali sono stati gestiti in Europa il caso Apple relativo ad iTunes in materia di concorrenza e quello ben noto ad Altroconsumo e ai lettori di questo blog sulla garanzia biennale di conformità in materia di diritto dei consumatori, l’Autore definisce l’enigma di Apple.
Condivido come sia in effetti necessario che l’enforcement dei diritti dei consumatori possa seguire nel prossimo futuro lo stesso modello di quello della concorrenza con una competenza centralizzata a livello europeo che si coordini con i livelli nazionali. Buona lettura:
Those of us who live and work in the world of competition law and policy are well used to a world that operates at multiple levels for enforcement, case review and policy discussions. Those rules have emerged over time as the EU has developed its competence in the area of competition law and it would be difficult to argue that Europe is a worse place for having multi-layered enforcement. We have well established procedures that tell us when a case should be looked at in Brussels and when it should be dealt with at a national level. We have also developed networks of competition agencies, in the form of the European Competition Network that meet regularly to discuss cases and issues and have processes that allow national authorities to claw back cases that they think are better looked at nationally but that the European Commission have already claimed as their own.
The reasons that competition law enforcement work so well at the national and regional level are many and varied. Firstly, the nature of competition regulation encompasses activities that can easily cross borders. One would hope that in a Single Market context cross border trade and activities are more common than under a more atomised European economy. Secondly, the firms engaged in mergers or indeed subject to antitrust scrutiny favour a ‘one-stop-shop’ approach to enforcement. Any cross border merger in Europe will affect each country in different ways and having a single authority able to review the proposed merger and make a single decision is enormously attractive. The alternative is 27 competing reviews that may throw up a whole mess of decisions. Thirdly, cost is an important factor – having to file a merger in 27 jurisdictions is a lot more expensive (in fees and legal costs) than doing one. Fourth, the outcomes from a single review are applicable in all member states – essentially everyone knows where they are.
Continua a leggere su Consumatori, Diritti e Mercato